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Using cross-national data from 2006–2016 and 174 states, this thesis 
details an investigation of the relationship between state fragility and the incidence 
of terrorism. The approach is threefold.  
The first step adapts the most common methodology from the literature, the 
negative binomial regression model, to reproduce existing outcomes by taking 
advantage of today's availability of broader data. However, as terrorism is 
endogenous to state fragility, I use the Arellano-Bond Estimator in the second step 
to overcome the reverse causality bias in this fragility-terrorism-nexus.  
The last step, a comparison of the outcomes of my two methodologies, finds 
the problems arising from this reverse causality bias are too substantial to use 
negative binomial regression as an appropriate model to derive strategies for 
policy makers. 
Moreover, the outcomes show that economic inequality and factionalization 
along ethnic and religious lines are root causes for terrorism, and that terrorism 
itself leads to more terrorism in the future. Additionally, my research finds that the 
influx of refugees has no impact on the occurrence of terrorism in the short term. 
However, subject to a society's capacity to assimilate groups, migration flows can 
have implications for the occurrence of terrorism over time. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the phenomenon of terror weighs heavily 
on the populace and makes headlines every day. This subjective perception of a 
growing prevalence of terror is fueled by a trend that expresses in an increased 
frequency of terrorist attacks and a growing number of fatalities caused by 
terrorism since the 1970s, as shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
Data for this graphic were accessed from Global Terrorism Database (2017). 
Figure 1.  Fatality and Number of Terrorist Attacks 
From a long-term perspective, however, this trend does not express a 
sustainable and constant increase. Rather, it reveals an unsteady pattern with 
peaks in the early 1980s and in the mid-1990s, followed by a decline until 2001. 
Then again, after the dramatic terrorist attacks of 9/11, the numbers of fatalities 
and terrorist attacks were on the rise. Since 2011, the trend has developed even 
more momentum, as can be observed in the chart with its exponential progression. 
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Regardless of whether these attacks in 2001 are considered a caesura in 
global history, the phenomenon of terror can be traced back in history and is a 
highly relevant topic. Subject to the numerous definitions of terrorism, we find 
terroristic violence as a means to gain power over others in the Roman Empire, in 
medieval times by a group of individuals called the Assassins, in the reign of terror 
at the time of the French Revolution, and in the dictatorships of the 20th century. 
The purpose of terror is manifold as it pursues different political, ideological, 
religious, economic, or social objectives. Based on its motivation and capabilities, 
terrorism targets governments, civilians, religions, infrastructure, tourists, and 
private property and uses diverse tactics and means of different scale to achieve 
its goals.  
This complex nature of terrorism makes it challenging, if not impossible, for 
governments to anticipate terrorist attacks. In an attempt to recognize patterns of 
terrorist activities, the research on terrorism grew rapidly in the aftermath of 9/11. 
In one study, Sandler identifies five key areas of this research, the “analyses of 
terrorist attack trends, the economic consequences of terrorism, the study of 
counterterrorism effectiveness, the causes of terrorism, and the relationship of 
terrorism and liberal democracies” (Sandler, 2014, p. 257). Furthermore, there is 
an increase of advanced econometric analyses (Security Economics) to identify 
and quantify determinants of terror. Alan B. Krueger, former Chairman of President 
Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers, approaches the phenomenon of terrorism 
with a systematic data-driven research. His well-recognized study debunks the 
popular assumption that poverty and poor education cause terrorism but reveals 
that “terrorism occurs within a social context” (Krueger, 2007, p. 6). Other studies 
have found that terrorism follows statistical patterns and provide empirical 
evidence that relates terrorism to socio-economic and political underdevelopment, 
as well as demographic and institutional factors (Krieger & Meierrieks 2011). 
Nevertheless, these attempts to identify determinants of terror do not remain 
undisputed as they treat terror predominantly homogeneously. In a discussion 
paper, Kis-Katos, Liebert, and Schulze (2012) allege that “the existing literature on 
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the determinants of terrorism treats terror as a uniform phenomenon” (p. 1) and 
thus challenge a too one-sided reflection. The authors develop a contextual 
approach to  
show that terror originates more often from richer and more 
urbanized countries and that economic growth and better 
infrastructure reduce terror levels. Moreover, […] democracy is 
unrelated to terror, except that terror originates significantly less from 
the most undemocratic states. Terror is rooted in unstable and 
conflict-ridden states and is strongly persistent. (Kis-Katos et al., 
2012, p. 29) 
The discussion about the origins of terror is often tied to a state’s relative 
stability or its opposite, fragility. In the aftermath of 9/11, national security 
documents have described failed states to “[…] offer terrorists […] safe haven and 
possible access to weapons of mass destruction” (Director of National Intelligence 
[DNI], 2009, p. 4). Even the most recent National Security Strategy (NSS) of the 
United States of America, references the significant security concerns that are 
associated with weak or failing states (President of the United States of America 
[POTUS], 2017). 
In a pioneering effort to analyze the relationship of state fragility and 
terrorism empirically, Piazza (2008) finds that "states experiencing intense state 
failures are statistically more likely to be the target of attacks and are more likely 
to have their nationals commit attacks overseas" (p.481). Furthermore, he finds 
that “the relationship between intensity and pervasiveness of state failure and 
transnational terrorism is linear” (Piazza, 2008, p. 483). Piazza justifies his findings 
based on the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents with a sample of 
2,632 observations from 2000 to 2006. By merging this data with the Fragile States 
Index (FSI) for the year 2006, he uses cross-sectional data for his analysis. 
Although methodologically sound, this approach leads to a bigger measurement 
error as he links the fragility value of the year 2006 to all the observations from 
2000 to 2006, which implies biased results. Knowing about some shortcomings of 
his initial approach, Piazza concedes that his study requires replication. 
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This thesis adopts Piazza’s idea to investigate the relationship of state 
fragility and the incidence of terror. It takes advantage of the broader data currently 
available by using panel data of the FSI from 2006 to 2016, merged with the data 
of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (Fund for Peace, 2017; University of 
Maryland, 2017). If evidence reveals that certain indicators of state fragility are 
positively correlated with the number of terrorist attacks, these results would 
provide a foundation for recognizing state at-risk characteristics and help to 
develop recommendations for policies and programs. 
Using cross-national data from 2006 to 2016 and 174 states, I use a 
threefold approach to conduct my analysis. The first step is to adapt the most 
common methodology from the literature, the negative binomial regression model, 
to reproduce existing outcomes. However, as terrorism is endogenous to state 
fragility, the second step uses the Arellano-Bond Estimator to overcome the 
reverse causality bias in this fragility-terrorism nexus. Finally, outcomes of the two 
methodologies reveals that the problems arising from this reverse causality bias 
are substantial, rendering the negative binomial regression an inappropriate model 
to derive strategies for policy makers. Moreover, the findings indicate that 
economic inequality and factionalization along ethnic and religious lines are root 
causes for terrorism and provide robust evidence that a terrorist attack today 
entails further terrorist attacks in the future. Thus, I show that the phenomenon of 
terrorism follows a self-sustaining mechanism. A further result shows that the influx 
of refugees has no impact on the occurrence of terrorism in the short term. 
Nevertheless, subject to a society's capacity to assimilate groups, migrations flows 
can have implications in the long term, as they can increase the factionalization of 
a country and eventually lead to a heightened perception of inequality. 
The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter II contains a literature review and 
gives an overview of the broad spectrum of results in previous research on the 
determinants of terrorism. Chapter III introduces and discusses the data and 
variables for the current analysis and presents different ways to operationalize 
terrorism. In Chapter IV, I describe my methodology and present my different 
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econometric models to reproduce results of other scholars as a first step. Then, a 
discussion of the outcomes serves as the next step, which eventually introduces a 
different methodology to address an endogeneity issue I identified. Chapter V 
presents my own results. In Chapter VI, I draw my conclusions, derive implications 
for policies, and furthermore give recommendations for future research. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
One of the main characteristics of terrorism is its surprising momentum and, 
at first glance, its inconsistent pattern, which makes predicting when and where 
terrorists will strike next difficult (Lawson & Stedmon, 2015). In addition to that, the 
uncertainty associated with terror is an intended byproduct in a terrorist’s strategy 
bringing with it serious psychological implications (Johnson, 1982). This intangible 
nature of terror, combined with the phenomenon of suicide attacks, might cause 
someone to presume that terrorists act irrationally, as though they value their 
principles and beliefs over their own life. Conversely, several scholars have 
attributed rationality to terrorists’ acts. Whereas Pape differentiates between those 
irrational or fanatical suicide terrorists and their leaders, who are more in a 
managerial role of pursuing an agenda of resistance and coercion (Pape, 2017), 
other researchers conclude that “the level of terrorism we observe is consistent 
with almost everyone being close to homo economicus, especially if we think in 
terms of the selfish gene rather than the selfish individual” (Caplan, 2006, p. 105). 
Either way, it is worth addressing the issue of the terrorists’ rationales to determine 
any patterns exist that would enable us to predict or derive the future behavior of 
terrorists.  
In an attempt to recognize patterns of terrorist activities, the research on 
terrorism grew rapidly in the aftermath of 9/11. In “an eclectic review of the 
analytical study of terrorism that views all agents as rational decision-makers” 
Sandler identifies five key areas of research that focus on the phenomenon and 
consequences of terrorism, namely the “analyses of terrorist attack trends, the 
economic consequences of terrorism, the study of counterterrorism effectiveness, 
the causes of terrorism, and the relationship of terrorism and liberal democracies” 
(Sandler, 2014, p. 257). Moreover, there is an increase in advanced econometric 
analyses to identify and quantify determinants of terror. These research papers 
“doing analytical work on terrorism have converged to a common definition of 
terrorism in keeping with the primary terrorist event databases” (Sandler, 2013, p. 
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768). Based on this collective understanding of terrorism, scholars have 
approached the phenomenon of terrorism with systematic data-driven research 
attempting to identify the determinants of terror. These studies provide empirical 
evidence that terrorism follows statistical patterns that relate terrorism to economic 
deprivation, political underdevelopment, socio-economic factors, demographic 
tensions, and religious and ethnic inequalities (Llussá & Tavares, 2007; Krieger et 
al., 2011; Meierrieks & Krieger, 2013). 
Attempts to explain the causes of terrorism with respect to economic 
deprivation, trace back in history. Gurr (1970) hypothesized that “the potential for 
collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative 
deprivation” (p. 360) and justifies his idea with the frustration-aggression 
mechanism of the human. He argues that the divergence between an individual’s 
expected income and his actual earnings is a catalyst for violent acts. This 
relationship matters for countries with a profile of significant economic inequality, 
as frustrated individuals might exhibit a lower inhibition threshold to carry out 
terrorist attacks. However, Gurr’s model remains simplistic as it does not consider 
any other influences such as political dysfunction or socio-economic factors. 
In fact, research including more variables than just economic deprivation 
similarly found this positive relationship between economic inequality and the 
increased incidence of terrorist attacks (Freytag, Krueger, Meierrieks, & 
Schneider, 2011). In addition to Gurr’s one-dimensional analysis, these models 
also controlled for socio-economic factors, level of education, unemployment, and 
poverty. The authors reveal that economic deprivation and poor socio-economic 
conditions are strongly associated with a higher rate of terrorist activity and justify 
their results with the economic principle of opportunity costs. Thus, the tradeoff 
between pursuing regular employment or engaging in terrorist activities 
characterizes one determinant of terrorism, as a rational actor’s decisions are 
influenced by reasonable cost-benefit considerations. Moreover, the authors 
conclude that terrorism is "predominantly rooted in unfavorable political and 
demographic conditions” (Freytag et al., 2011, p. 16). The same positive 
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relationship between terrorism and economic deprivation, measured by inequality, 
unemployment, lack of education, and factionalization along ethnic and religious 
lines, was discovered by George, and Caruso and Schneider (George, 2016; 
Caruso & Schneider 2013). In contrast to these findings, other scholars found only 
little evidence for this association. Krueger included further control variables in his 
model and found that “lack of education and income are not important root causes 
for terrorism”; however, “they can be part of the solution” (Krueger, 2007, p.51). 
According to Krieger and Meierrieks (2011), “there is only limited evidence to 
support the hypothesis that economic deprivation causes terrorism” (p. 10). They 
find instead that this relationship gets more insignificant “once it is controlled for 
institutional and political factors” (Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011, p. 10). 
Another controversially discussed determinant of terrorism is the 
relationship between terrorism and the number of refugees in a country. Whereas 
Choi and Salehyan (2013) find evidence that “countries with many refugees are 
more likely to experience both domestic and international terrorism” (p. 53), 
Randahl (2016) concludes that his “results clearly give no support at all for the 
hypothesis that refugees would cause an increase in either the incidence or 
magnitude of terrorism in their host countries” (p. 51). 
With respect to diverse societies, scholars found that factionalization along 
ethnic and religious lines can foster terrorism, too (Gassebner & Luechinger, 
2011). Blomberg, Gaibulloev, and Sandler (2011) show that terrorist organizations 
are “bolstered by democratic institutions and an intermediate level of ethnic 
factionalization at home” (p. 441). They provide good arguments for their results 
by stating that heterogeneous societies have a higher capacity to assimilate 
groups whereas more homogeneous societies are simply more intolerant of 
terrorist activities and therefore actively counter insurgents more deliberately. 
Other studies also found evidence of this positive relationship between terrorism 
and the degree of factionalization (Kis-Katos et al., 2012; Schulz, 2015). However, 
as Mascarenhas and Sandler (2014) show, a linguistic factionalization is not 
significantly related to terrorism.  
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Another determinant of terrorism relates to the political order of a nation-
state. In his qualitative analysis Johnson (1982) showed that the stability of social 
organization requires coercive power imposed by a governmental authority. A lack 
thereof implies a reasonable risk of violence and “since violence is both the 
negation of, and a possibility in, all social systems, sociologists regard it as one of 
the major criteria for defining a social system and for evaluating the degree of the 
system’s stability” (p.10). Correspondingly, policy makers and scholars have 
pointed to significant security concerns associated with weak or failing states 
(POTUS, 2017; Hagel, 2004; Newman, 2007; Rice, 2006; George, 2016). 
Interestingly, Hehir (2007) found that “there is no causal link or pronounced 
correlation … between democratization and the negation of terrorism” as an 
indicator; rather the legitimate coercive power of governance, not the  particular 
type of a political system, determines the level of terrorism (p. 328). Whereas 
Johnson performs no statistical tests on his study of the relationship between 
fragility and the incidence of terror, there are only few quantitative analyses 
investigating this nexus (Piazza, 2008; Tikuisis, 2009; Okafor & Piesse, 2017). As 
already stated in the previous chapter, Piazza finds statistical evidence that 
unstable countries are significantly more susceptible to terrorist attacks and 
moreover are incubators of terror (Piazza, 2008). His results might be misleading, 
however, because terrorism is endogenous to his measure of state failure, and he 
did not address this reverse causality bias, as fragility might lead to terrorism, 
which consequently destabilizes a country. Okafor and Piesse (2017) found the 
same relationship; however, they base their findings on a dataset with little 
statistical power as they restrict their data to a sample of those 38 countries in the 
top category of the FSI, and thus are all considered to be fragile. “Generally though, 
there are too few analyses of failure’s potential relationship to terrorism to make 
any definitive claims” concludes Coggins (Coggins, 2015, p. 458). 
This review of the broad and sometimes incoherent literature illustrates the 
range of results. “However fruitful, the diversity of terrorism research was not 
accompanied by any substantial increase in cross-fertilization between themes 
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and methodologies” conclude Llussá and Tavares (2011, p. 105–106) in their 
portrait of the existing knowledge on the economics of terrorism. Their argument 
finds further support by Kis-Katos et al. (2012), who noticed a “standard model in 
the empirical analysis of terrorism” (p. 13). As a result of this homogeneity, Llussá 
and Tavares (2011) documented an “almost schizophrenic” (p. 113) imbalance 
between empirical and theoretical methods and derived a “latent demand for either 
empirical validation of existing concepts, or formalization of empirical regularities” 
(p. 113). Despite the marked similarity of the approaches and methodologies in the 
documented research, the variety of outcomes is surprising, and some results are 
even highly contradictive. A reason for this can be a detail that all the cited studies 
have in common; they neither acknowledge nor address the problem of a reverse 
causality bias in the research field of finding determinants of terror, although 
terrorism is often endogenous to their numerous determinants of terror. In general, 
only a few scholars have addressed these implications of a reverse causality bias 
in their attempts to identify predictors of terrorism (Kang & Lee, 2005; Meierrieks 
& Gries, 2013; Krieger & Meierrieks, 2015).  
With respect to the described gaps in literature, I adopt Piazza’s idea to 
investigate the relationship of state fragility and the incidence of terror. This study 
takes advantage of the broader data available today by using panel data of the FSI 
from 2006 to 2016, merged with the data of the GTD (Fund for Peace, 2017; 
University of Maryland, 2017). Furthermore, I address the issue of endogeneity in 
this nexus and introduce a different methodology to overcome the reverse 
causality bias in Chapter III. If evidence reveals that certain indicators of state 
fragility are related with the number of terrorist attacks, these results would provide 
a foundation for recognizing state at-risk characteristics and help to develop 
recommendations for policies and programs. Furthermore, my new findings can 
allow readers to determine the extent to which terrorism is endogenous to 
indicators of state fragility. 
 
 12 
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III. DATA AND CODING OF THE VARIABLES 
This chapter presents the data and describes the variables used in this 
thesis. Furthermore, it illustrates the methodology used and places it in the context 
of current literature. This research uses data from the GTD retrieved from the 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 
(START) and data from the FSI provided by the Fund for Peace (FFP) (Fund for 
Peace, 2017; University of Maryland, 2017).  
A. THE GLOBAL TERRORIST DATABASE 
This thesis uses the GTD provided by START for the years 2006 to 2016. 
The incident-based definition of terrorism used by the GTD defines terror as “the 
threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain 
a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or 
intimidation” (GTD, 2017). This definition pronounces three inclusion criteria to 
consider an incident to be a terroristic incident listed in the GTD. The following 
characteristics must be present: 
The incident must be intentional—the result of a conscious 
calculation on the part of a perpetrator.   
The incident must entail some level of violence or immediate 
threat of violence ‐including property violence, as well as violence 
against people.   
The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub‐national actors. 
The database does not include acts of state terrorism  
In addition, at least two of the following three criteria must be present 
for an incident to be included in the GTD:  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Criterion 1: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, 
economic, religious, or social goal. In terms of economic goals, 
the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion. It must 
involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic economic change.   
Criterion 2: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, 
intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience 
(or audiences) than the immediate victims. It is the act taken as a 
totality that is considered, irrespective if every individual involved in 
carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As long as any of the 
planners or decision‐makers behind the attack intended to coerce, 
intimidate, or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met.   
Criterion 3: The action must be outside the context of legitimate 
warfare activities. That is, the act must be outside the parameters 
permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the 
prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non‐
combatants). (GTD, 2017, p. 9) 
Based on these inclusion criteria, the dataset used contains information on 
92,286 terrorist attacks and lists 135 different variables.  
B. THE FRAGILE STATES INDEX 
This thesis uses panel data from the FSI for the years 2006 to 2016. The 
data is compiled by the FFP and provides “an annual ranking of 178 countries 
based on the different pressures they face that impact their levels of fragility” (Fund 
for Peace, 2017, p. 3). The FSI uses a Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) 
to comprehensively triangulate “three primary streams of dataquantitative, 
qualitative, and expert validation”to obtain the final FSI score per country and 
year (Fund for Peace, 2017, p. 3). The index is designed to examine various 
indicators of state condition to determine a state’s relative stability and its resilience 
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to potential conflicts. The index is updated annually and contains data collected 
between January 1 and December 31 of the respective year.  
The FSI covers a diverse array of 12 indicator variables categorized as 
cohesion, economic, political, and social indicators. The key indicators are Security 
Apparatus, Factionalized Elites, Group Grievances, Economic Decline, Uneven 
Economic Development, Human Flight and Brain Drain, State Legitimacy, Public 
Services, Human Rights and Rule of Law, Demographic Pressures, Refugees and 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) and External Intervention (Fund for Peace, 
2017). 
Each indicator variable has its own 10-point scale, which reaches from 1 to 
10, where higher values indicate a higher degree of state fragility, thus designating 
unfavorable conditions. Accordingly, low values are an indicator of a higher level 
of state capacity and resilience. The aggregate score of all 12 indicator variables 
is given by the total FSI score and ranges from 12 to 120.   
Haims, Gompert, Treverton and Stearns (2008) endorsed the FSI as an 
appropriate metric to determine the relative stability of a state, based on a country’s 
total FSI score. According to this study, “countries with an aggregate score above 
90 are in the ‘alert’ zone; countries with an aggregate score between 60 and 89.9 
are in the ‘warning’ zone; those with an aggregate score between 30 and 59.9 are 
in the ‘monitoring’ zone; those with aggregate scores of 29.9 or below are in the 
‘sustainable’ zone” (Haims, Gompert, Treverton, & Stearns, 2008, p. 1). Moreover, 
Newman examined the FSI to be the most suitable indicator of state condition in 
his relational assessment of FSI, the Human Development Index (HDI), and the 
World Bank Rule of Law, Government Effectiveness, and Political Stability 
indicators (Newman, 2007). Nonetheless, the design of the FSI remains 
proprietary to the FFP and is sometimes hard comprehend as its indicator 
variables are fed by further sub-indicators. An exhaustive list concerning the 
design of the FSI with respect to its sub-indicators can be found in Table 1 and 
were discussed by J. J. Messner (email to author, November 17, 2017).  
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C. COMPILED DATABASE 
The dataset compiled for this thesis contains merged data from the GTD 
and the FSI. This thesis uses the incident-based definition of terrorism given by 
the GTD. The countries or states investigated in this analysis are all sovereign 
states with a membership in the United Nations (UN) and are in accordance with 
the list of countries used by the FSI. For the purpose of merging, I commonly used 
the English terminology for all countries. A derogation from the definition of a 
country as stated concerns the State of Israel. In my database, Israel is coded to 
include the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Moreover, it incorporates all observations 
of Palestine. Although 136 of the 193 Member States of the United Nations 
recognize and acknowledge the sovereignty of Palestine, I did not regard it as an 
entity. My coding, however, does not follow any political conviction, but pursues 
the most methodologically reasonable way to mitigate the impact of any associated 
measurement error bias.  
The compiled dataset lists the number of incidents per country and year 
(incperyear variable) for the period from 2006 to 2016. In all, this set of panel data 
contains 1,921 observations for incidents per country and year referencing a total 
of 92,286 incidents. Moreover, the data contains FSI scores for 174 countries.  
1. Dependent Variables 
In the several models of this thesis, I use three different dependent variables. 
These variables are explained in the following paragraphs. 
a. Number of Incidents per Country and Year (incperyear) 
The dependent variable is incperyear, which is a count variable indicating 
the number of terrorist incidents incurred per country and year. It was derived from 
the GTD and coded to collapse the terror events in country year counts. This 
variable is the most common way scholars have operationalized terrorism in their 
econometric research (Young, 2016) and is therefore best suited for my analysis 
to obtain comparable results and evaluate them in context. Moreover, “replicating 
 17 
results helps build a solid empirical foundation and points toward limits of our 
theories or ambiguity in the precise relationships we think occur” (Young, 2016). 
Furthermore, this operationalization of terrorism is appropriate to align best with 
the incident-based definition of terrorism introduced by the GTD.  
The data of this count variable is highly overdispersed; thus, the data shows 




b. Aggregated Value of Total Damage (logtotalvalue) 
In an attempt to use a different operationalization of terrorism as 
recommended by Young, I conduct an analysis using the same econometric 
models, but with a different dependent variable (Young, 2016). In my attempt to 
measure the impact of terrorism, I coded my variable analogously to Rohlfs and 
Sullivan (2013). Although the authors presented their approach in a different 
context, it is a proper way to monetize the casualties associated with terror, hence, 
to indirectly capture the scale of terrorism.  
This second dependent variable, logtotalvalue, expresses the logarithmic 
aggregate value of the total damage incurred per country and year. It is used to 
allow the determination of terrorism not only by the number of incidents but also in 
terms of magnitude. An appropriate metric to measure this scale of terrorist 
activities can be attained by assigning dollar values to each incident. The 
aggregate value of total damage is determined by the number of kills (nkill) and 
total number of wounded (nwound), multiplied by the value of a Statistical Life 
(VSL) and the Relative Disutility Factors by Injury Severity Level (MAIS) times VSL, 
respectively (Rohlfs & Sullivan, 2013). Both values are derived from the guidance 
 18 
of the U.S. Department of Transportation, where the VSL is set to $9.6 million1 
(U.S. Department of Transportation, 2016). The disutility factors by MAIS is set to 
.105 for serious and .266 for severe injuries. For my estimate, I assume an average 
injury level in the consequence of a terrorist attack to be between serious to severe, 
which yields an average disutility factor of .1855. Accordingly, the value of 
wounded is derived by nwound x (.1855 x $9,600,000) = $1,780,800. As the GTD 
data is not suited to derive the affected property value sufficiently, it is not included 
in this variable to mitigate the associated measurement error bias. Furthermore, I 
did not discount the amount of total damage to the net present value (NPV). 
It is important to emphasize that in this context the usage of a dependent 
variable is not suitable to validate my initial count regression model as Young finds 
that the coefficient estimates of explanatory variables significantly vary across 
different operationalizations of terrorism. Nonetheless, accounting for the weight 
or intensity of terrorist acts might reveal further insights. 
c. Aggregated Value of Total Kills and Total Wounded (totalvalue)  
“Another way to operationalize terrorism … is to count casualties or 
fatalities” as the magnitude of terrorism gets more obvious (Young, 2016, p. 6). 
Accordingly, I introduce a third dependent variable, the one of the aggregated 
value of total kills and total wounded (totalvalue). This variable is coded to sum 
both the numbers of persons killed (nkill) and numbers of persons wounded 
(nwound) collapsed to country year counts. Compared to the both previously 
introduced dependent variables, this regressand is a more balanced metric to 
operationalize terrorism. However, I did not weight nkill and nwound differently.   
                                            
1 The VSL provided by the U.S. Department of Transportation, used to derive this dependent 
variable, is designed for US casualties only and could differ by country. However, for the purpose 
of mitigating a measurement error, I attached the same dollar values to all victims, regardless 
their nationality, as the GTD generally allows only a distinction by US-citizen or Non-US-citizen. 
Moreover, this coding prevents an ethically motivated discussion about the determination of 
equitable value of life.  
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2. Independent Variables 
In the following, I introduce my set of dependent variables provided by the 
FSI. 
a. The Total FSI Score (totalFSI) 
The total FSI Score (totalFSI) is an index score designed to assess a 
country’s vulnerability to collapse. It is an indicator of a state’s condition and allows 
us to determine the relative stability of a country. This totalFSI variable represents 
the aggregate values of in total 12 conflict risk indicator variables and provides a 
snapshot in time at December 31 of any year. It is rated on a 0 to 120 scale, with 
0 being stable or most resilient, and 120 being most at risk (Fund for Peace, 2014). 
b. Security Apparatus (Security Apparatus) 
The indicator variable Security Apparatus provided by the FSI measures 
how peaceful security is under a government’s control. Low values of this index 
score indicate that the government uses little to no force to maintain stability, 
whereas high values imply that the “monopoly on the use of violence by the state 
is compromised by widespread proliferation of private militias” (Fund for Peace, 
2014, p. 14). This variable, furthermore, captures the impacts of terrorism a country 
incurs (see Appendix A), and thus measures a value that may be a result of 
terrorism as well as its cause. Accordingly, I handle this variable with caution to 
mitigate the associated endogeneity concerns. 
c. Factionalized Elites (Factionalized Elites) 
The conflict risk indicator variable Factionalized Elites determines the level 
of fragmentation of ruling elites along racial, religious, or ethnic lines. A low index 
score for this variable indicates the existence of a “popular and effective national 
leadership, with rival political interest articulated and represented through free 
political expression in a legitimate constitutional structure supported by the people” 
(Fund for Peace, 2014). Conversely, higher values designate a fractious political 
class unable to overcome the discords of a society with the ruling elites. It 
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describes the state of absence of a legitimate and broadly accepted government 
that fails to represent the entire citizenry, where political structures are not rooted 
in the majority of the society, thus lacking legitimacy and furthermore effective 
governance.  
d. Group Grievance (Group Grievance) 
This explanatory variable is a measure of homogeneity of a state’s society. 
Low values imply that ethnic divisions are not delineated with sharp distinction and 
“individual rights and grievances are addressed through the legal and political 
system, civil society and free expression and advocacy” (Fund for Peace, 2014, p. 
7). In contrast, high values indicate a high level of group grievance, which leads to 
organized acts of extreme violence such as sporadic outbursts, group-based 
violence, ethnic cleansing, and genocide of minorities.  
e. Economy (Economy) 
The conflict risk indicator variable Economy assesses the relative stability 
of a country’s economic situation. Low values are proof of a stable and growing 
economy with low unemployment, a moderate inflation rate, and favorable 
projected indicators. Conversely, a high index score indicates a weak economy in 
a severe decline, experiencing a high inflation rate and a low GDP (Fund for Peace, 
2014). 
f. Economic Inequality (Economic Inequality) 
This variable determines the grade of group-based real and perceived 
inequality. It is designed to account for the poverty level, the level of education, 
housing, hiring practices, and economic justice along group lines. Low values imply 
a low level of inequality, thus representing a high level of homogeneity, whereas 
higher scores describe a state of severe uneven economic development that might 
result in violence (Fund for Peace, 2014). 
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g. Human Flight and Brain Drain (Human Flight and Brain Drain) 
The Human Flight and Brain Drain conflict risk indicator variable measures 
the loss of intellectuals, professionals, and political dissidents and accounts for 
voluntary emigration from a country. It does not describe forced migration and 
refugee flows. A higher index score indicates that the brain drain of a country has 
become chronic and sustained, which results in a significant decline of the 
professional and middle class of the country. Conversely, lower values are proof 
of a brain drain that is more balanced with brain gain; thus, it is an indication of a 
small risk of potential loss of the educated classes (Fund for Peace, 2014). 
h. State Legitimacy (State Legitimacy) 
This indicator variable is a measure of the amount of corruption in the 
government. A low score implies a low level of dishonesty within the administration 
and moreover functioning anti-corruption mechanisms. On the other hand, a high 
index score indicates an illegitimate government where corruption is endemic. The 
level of transparency and accountability is associated with a widespread loss of 
confidence in state institutions, which might result in “widely boycotted or flawed 
elections, mass public demonstrations, civil disobedience, and inability of the state 
to collect taxes, resistance to military conscription,” and “rise of armed 
insurgencies” (Fund for Peace, 2014, p. 11). 
i. Public Services (Public Services) 
The Public Services conflict risk indicator variable “refers to the lack of, or 
disappearance of, basic state functions that serve the people” (Fund for Peace, 
2014, p. 12). A low score indicates that public services are well developed and 
accessible in both urban and rural areas. Conversely, high values are proof of a 
deteriorated public service infrastructure.  
j. Human Rights (Human Rights) 
The indicator variable for Human Rights is a measure of “abuse of legal, 
political and social rights, including those of individuals, groups and institutions 
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(e.g., harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military 
for political ends, public repression of political opponents)” (Fund for Peace, 2014, 
p. 12). States that apply human rights “equally to all on all levels” are considered 
to be stable with respect to this indicator, and thus have a low index score. In 
contrast, those states that systematically harass minorities and violate human 
rights are designated with a high score value (Fund for Peace, 2014, p. 12). 
Simultaneously, civil society and open media declines with an increase of this 
index value. 
k. Demographic Pressures (Demographic Pressures) 
The Demographic Pressures conflict risk indicator variable reflects the 
grade of demographic pressure arising from population density, group settlement 
patterns, population growth rates, and a skewed population distribution. 
Furthermore, it accounts for pressure stemming from natural disasters, epidemics, 
and environmental hazards. High score values are evidence of a high level of 
demographic pressure affecting large segments of the population and “massive 
threats to livelihood” (Fund for Peace, 2014, p. 5). Meager demographic pressure 
is associated with a low index score.  
l. Refugees and Internally-Displaced Persons (Refugees and 
IDPs) 
A state’s vulnerability caused by refugees and migrations is assessed by 
the Refugees and IDPs variable. It measures the numbers of refugees and 
internally-displaced peoples fleeing or entering a region/country as well as the level 
of absorption in the host society. The bigger the influx of refugees and the lower 
the level of absorption in the host country, the more vulnerable a country is to these 
migration movements. Thus, this results in a higher score value (Fund for Peace, 
2014). 
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m. External Intervention (External Intervention) 
The External Intervention indicator variable measures the extent of the full 
spectrum of means of external interventions. Relatively moderate types of 
intervention, indicated by lower scores, are economic interventions by external 
actors, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), development projects, 
and foreign assistance. More powerful means of external interventions are military 
engagements such as covert and overt interventions, externally supported militia, 
and in its strongest form, peacekeeping missions (Fund for Peace, 2014). 
3. Evaluation of the Data 
The data used in my thesis are open source data and not purposefully 
collected to be a perfect fit to find answers to my research questions. Accordingly, 
it is important to acknowledge that some bias might arise from my database. The 
fact that the data were collected along conventional political borders rather than 
clans, ethnicities, and religious denominations might dilute my results in terms of 
significance. However, this measurement problem is mitigated as my data are 
coded to match GTD and FSI along the same geographic entities. Another problem 
arises from the data coming from the GTD. The data provided by this database, 
and subsequently used in this thesis, include information about worldwide terrorist 
attacks that reportedly occurred between 2006 and 2016. This incident-based 
database implies an underreporting bias as the data are based on open media 
sources (GTD, 2017). “The essence of underreporting is the suspicion that 
observed terrorist events might well not correspond to the actual numbers of 
attacks, as only the events that found their way into open sources, such as the 
media, have actually been reported” (Drakos & Gofas, 2016, p. 715). Especially 
data from states known to censor or control media might be biased. The 
observation of considerable zeros for nondemocratic countries (e.g., North Korea) 
on the one hand, and the increasing number of reported terrorist attacks for states 
with higher levels of polity, on the other hand, are indicators of an attributable issue 
with the data, resulting in an underreporting bias for countries with suppressed 
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media and an “encouragement-effect” for countries with open media (Drakos & 
Gofas, 2016, p. 715). This “encouragement-effect” suggests the number of terrorist 
events increases along with the level of democratization (Drakos & Gofas, 2016, 
p. 715) and implies an endogeneity issue creating a reverse causality bias that 
must be accounted for and is eliminated with Model 5 and Model 7.1 of my 
analysis. The gap resulting from the underreporting bias, representing the 
difference between reported and actual events, is of lesser significance, in the case 
that this error was uncorrelated with the country characteristics. However, Drakos 
and Gofas found evidence that this problem relates to press freedom (Drakos & 
Gofas, 2016). Hence, this bias has implications for a country level analysis of 
terrorism and requires a thoughtful explanation in terms of magnitude. 
Nonetheless, the GTD provides the most comprehensive data on terrorist events 
worldwide and has become a well-recognized standard for data-driven research 
on the phenomenon on terror (Kis-Katos et al., 2012). Given the limitations induced 
by the underreporting bias, this database provides the most accurate information 
available. It, furthermore, “can be used in conjunction with other data (e.g., political 
or economic indicators) in analyses of the causes and consequences of terrorism 
and can contribute information to analyses of how, when and why and [sic] 
terrorism events and campaigns decline or end” (Sheehan, 2011, p. 24).  
With respect to the data provided by the FSI, it is important to admit other 
possible sources of biases. This index is designed to examine various indicators 
of state condition to determine a state’s relative stability and its resilience to 
potential conflicts. The proprietary CAST framework used to measure this level of 
stability takes advantage of huge quantities of data and incorporates several 
hundred sub-indicators that flow into the 12 conflict risk indicator variables (Fund 
for Peace, 2017). As a result of this comprehensive approach, the indicator 
variable Security Apparatus is designed to partially account for the level of 
terrorism occurring in a country. Against the background of my analysis, this 
implies a bias if I included this variable in my models, as it accounts for terrorism 
in the dependent and the explanatory variable at the same time. Consequently, I 
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do not include this variable to alleviate this bias; however, at the same time, I might 
lose valuable data by my attempt to prevent collinearity. Furthermore, the span 
and the bandwidth of the conflict risk indicator variables are large, whereas the 
scale of each variable is relatively small as it is limited to values from 1 to 10. For 
example, the number of fleeing refugees, expressed by the variable’s Refugees 
and IDPs index score, varies from several hundred (score of 7) to millions (score 
of 10) within a range of just four index points. Another example describing this 
enormous span is given by the External Intervention variable, which accounts for 
all types of instruments of external interventions, namely relatively moderate types 
of intervention, such as economic interventions and development projects, but also 
more powerful means like military engagements and peacekeeping missions. 
Knowing about these circumstances and given a reasonable confidence level 
(95%), it requires thoughtful explanations and circumspection to explain the results 
of my analysis of the fragility-terrorism nexus. 
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IV. METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this research with a non-experimental descriptive design is 
to examine and discern the underlying relationship of state fragility and the 
phenomenon of terrorism. Furthermore, it can help to identify certain 
characteristics of state fragility that are associated with the occurrence of terrorist 
activities. The primary research question of this thesis is: 
 What characteristics make states susceptible for terrorist attacks?  
If evidence of the findings reveals that certain indicators of state fragility are 
strongly correlated with the likelihood of terrorist attacks, it would be interesting to 
quantify the magnitude of the associated risk. Once determined, these results 
would provide a foundation for recognizing state at-risk characteristics and help to 
develop recommendations for policies and programs to address those factors. The 
secondary research question of this thesis addresses this problem as follows: 
 How do indicators of state fragility affect the likelihood of terrorist 
attacks and to what extent?  
The approach of my research is threefold. In a first step, I adapt the most 
common regression model used in this field of research to investigate the 
relationship of the numbers of terrorist attacks and state fragility (Kis-Katos et al., 
2012; Gassebner & Luechinger, 2011). As the data is highly overdispersed, the 
appropriate count regression model is the negative binomial regression model 
(NBR). It is “best suited to accommodate these data […] and has become the 
standard model in the empirical analysis of terrorism” (Kis-Katos et al., 2012, p. 
13). In accordance with several scholars, this thesis includes fixed effects to 
properly account for country specific characteristics (Kis-Katos et al., 2012; 
Gassebner & Luechinger, 2011).  
All estimated coefficients in this thesis are reported in incidence-rate ratios 
(IRR), that is 𝑒𝛽𝑖rather than 𝛽𝑖, to allow an interpretation not only in terms of 
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significance and direction but also in terms of magnitude. Accordingly, IRR can be 
interpreted similarly to the odds ratio in a logistics regression model. To be able to 
evaluate the performance of the developed models with respect to how well they 
approximate and explain the data, the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and 
Bayesian information criterion (BIC) are reported for each model. Both information 
criteria allow the selection of econometric models across a pool of candidate 
models and concurrently prevent an overfitting of the model, as they penalize 
excessive use of variables, artificially inflating the models. Lower values for AIC 
and BIC designate the best model out of the pool of candidate models.  
Using the industrial standard of regression analysis for my first model 
should not obscure the fact that the NBR does not appropriately account for the 
role of endogeneity in this fragility-terrorism nexus that stems from a reverse 
causality bias, as fragility might lead terrorism, which consequently destabilizes a 
country. Given this fact, it is reasonable to assume that terrorism has a self-
sustaining potential. In general, only a few scholars have addressed these 
implications of a reverse causality bias in their attempts to identify determinants of 
terrorism (Kang & Lee, 2005; Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011; Meierrieks & Gries, 
2013). To overcome the fact that endogeneity plagues this most common 
econometric model to estimate the fragility-terrorism nexus, I conduct an 
instrumental variable (IV) approach in a second step (Model 5). An Arellano-Bond 
Dynamic Panel Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) Estimator (Arellano-Bond 
Estimator) and the available longitudinal data provide plausible instruments to 
overcome this reverse causality bias (Arellano & Bond, 1991). This linear Dynamic 
Panel Regression Model uses two lags of the dependent variable included as 
additional regressors and furthermore treats all explanatory indicator variables as 
endogenous variables. The model uses a robust variance estimator to obtain 
robustness against heteroskedasticity. On the assumption the instrumental 
variables are valid and that there is no autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic errors, 
this model allows for the identification of true causal effects rather than simple 
correlations.  
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The third step is a comparison of the outcomes of the NBR models with the 
causal implications derived from the linear Dynamic Panel Regression Model from 
step two, which evaluates the impact of the endogeneity problem in the fragility-
terrorism relationship. Ultimately, I draw conclusions about the applicability of the 
NBR as the most common regression model used in the field of research for finding 
determinants of terror.  
A. INTRODUCTION OF THE DIFFERENT MODELS 
In the course of this thesis I introduce in total seven different models. The 
first four models are estimated by the NBR technique, and thus are designed to 
comply with the ‘industrial standard’ in the empirical research area about terrorism 
(Kis-Katos et al., 2012). In the remaining three models and their enhancements, I 
use the Dynamic Panel GMM approach introduced by Arellano and Bond (Arellano 
& Bond, 1991) to address an endogeneity issue in the fragility-terrorism nexus. In 
an attempt to validate my findings, I use three different operationalizations of 
terrorism introduced in Chapter III with Model 7.1, Model 7.2, and Model 7.3. 
1. The Negative Binomial Regression Models 
In the following segment I will introduce my models using the NBR 
technique.  
a. Model 1: Number of Terrorist Attacks and State Fragility 
The dependent variable in Model 1 to Model 7.1 is the number of incidents 
per country and year (incperyear). The set of panel data used contains state-level 
data that observe the same units (FSI scores) at different points in time. My Y and 
X variables are dated contemporaneously. The model relating Y to X in this time-
series analysis is shown in Equation (1): 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = α + 𝐗′𝐢𝐭𝛉 + 𝜐𝑖𝑡 (1) 
where my dependent variable, the number of terrorist attacks, is denoted by 𝑌𝑖𝑡 in 
country i and year t. The vector 𝐗′ is the set of my control variables given by the 
FSI and 𝜐𝑖𝑡 is the error term.  
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The first model of this thesis (Model 1) is designed to examine the 
relationship between the number of terrorist incidents and the respective stability 
of a country in a year using the NBR model including fixed effects. It is not designed 
to explicitly find causation. Its purpose is to replicate the results from Piazza by 
taking advantage of panel data and to consider whether the security concerns 
associated with weak or failing states are observable and verifiable in the data and 
therefore justify a further and more detailed investigation (Piazza, 2008; POTUS, 
2017). Accordingly, the dependent variable in Model 1 is incperyear and the 
explanatory variable is the aggregate FSI score per country and year (totalFSI). 
The results of Model 1 are shown in Table 1 in Chapter V. All coefficient estimates 
are reported in incident rate ratios. 
b. Model 2: Raw Data Analysis—Number of Terrorist Attacks and 
State Fragility 
As mentioned before, the FSI is designed to examine various indicators of 
state condition to determine a state’s relative stability and its resilience to potential 
conflicts. This index covers a broad array of in total 12 cohesion, economic, 
political, and social indicators. Model 2 takes advantage of these more detailed 
data to conduct a raw data analysis. Again, a negative binomial regression analysis 
using fixed effects is the model of choice. Whereas Model 1 estimates a joint effect 
of all 12 indicator variables at a time, and therefore provides a coefficient estimate 
that must be interpreted as a weighted average of these, Model 2 assesses the 
associated numbers of terrorist attacks of every single indicator. This allows a 
more precise estimation of the single attribute’s impact on the number of terrorist 
incidents. 
In Model 2, incperyear remains the dependent variable, and only one of my 
indicator variables at a time, one after the other, is regressed on it. The resulting 
coefficient estimates report the numbers of terrorist attacks associated with every 
single indicator variable in IRR. Appendix B shows the results from this raw data 
analysis. 
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c. Model 3: Long Model—Joint Estimate of the Indicator 
Variables’ Impact 
Model 3 is designed to estimate the joint impact of the indicator variables 
on the number of terrorist attacks. However, it includes just 11 out of the 12 
indicator variables at a time. The indicator variable Security Apparatus was omitted 
for collinearity reasons as this variable already incorporates terrorist attacks as one 
of its sub-indicators and furthermore to mitigate any resulting measurement errors. 
The results of this estimation are shown in Table 2 in Chapter V. Again, all 
coefficient estimates are reported in IRR.  
d. Model 4: Best Fitted Model—Number of Terrorist Attacks and 
Indicators of State Fragility 
Model 4 is the best fitted model given the data and based on the knowledge 
gained from my previous models. Again, it accounts for the aforementioned 
reverse causality problem as it does not include the indicator variable Security 
Apparatus.  
It relates the previously found statistically significant explanatory indicator 
variables Economic Inequality, Public Services, Demographic Pressures, 
Refugees and IDPs, and State Legitimacy to the number of terrorist attacks and 
further controls for Group Grievance, Economy, Human Flight and Brain Drain, and 
Factionalized Elites. Like all previous models, this model includes fixed effects, 
and the coefficient estimates are reported in incident rate ratios. The results of this 
regression model are shown in Table 3 in Chapter V. 
2. Finding Causality with the Arellano-Bond Estimator 
As argued earlier, endogeneity plagues the most common econometric 
model to estimate the fragility-terrorism nexus. To overcome this reverse causality 
bias I take advantage of my panel data, which can provide insight into the 
underlying dynamics of the relationship that is subject to investigation in this thesis. 
Consequently, I conduct an IV approach in the next step (Model 5 to Model 7.3) 
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by using the Arellano-Bond Estimator, which was designed for panels with small 
periods and large Ns (Arellano & Bond, 1991). 
Accordingly, the equation introduced in Model 1, which estimates the impact 
of state fragility on the number of terrorist attacks in a panel dataset, as further 
modified in this model, is denoted by: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = α + 𝛽1𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐗′𝐢𝐭𝛉 + 𝐙′𝐢,𝐭−𝟏 + 𝜐𝑖𝑡 (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 represents the number of terrorist attacks and 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 is its lagged value. 
Furthermore, 𝐗′ is my matrix of the included fragility indicator variables and 𝐙′ 
represents the matrix of the corresponding lagged values of my endogenous 
regressors used as further instruments. By first differencing all regressors, the 
Arellano-Bond Estimator transforms Equation (1) into: 
 ∆𝑌𝑖𝑡 = α + 𝛽1∆𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∆𝐗′𝐢𝐭𝛉 + ∆𝐙′𝐢,𝐭−𝟏 + ∆𝜐𝑖𝑡 (2) 
making the endogenous variables pre-determined as they get instrumented with 
their past levels and, thus, are no longer correlated with my error term in Equation 
(1). In case the lagged variable is still correlated with the error term, a higher order 
lag is used as an instrument instead. Under the assumption that the Xs were 
initially correlated with the error term, the first differencing now provides valid 
instruments for all pre-determined or strictly endogenous variables (Arellano & 
Bond, 1991). The resulting coefficient estimates become unbiased as they are no 
longer correlated with the initial error term. 
a. Model 5: Short Model Using Arellano-Bond Estimator 
As I did for Model 1, I investigate the relationship between state fragility and 
the number of terrorist attacks with Model 5. In particular, I use a two-step Arellano-
Bond Estimator for this model, which uses one lag of the dependent variable 
included as additional regressors and furthermore treats all explanatory indicator 
variables as strictly endogenous variables. Additionally, my Model 5 uses a robust 
variance estimator to obtain robustness against heteroskedasticity. I tested several 
lag structures and found that a two-step model with varying numbers of lags was 
needed to pass the specification tests that are compulsory for this methodology. 
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My model satisfies the condition of the test for autocorrelation provided by Arellano 
and Bond and was obtained with the Stata command ‘estat abond’ (Arellano & 
Bond, 1991). This post-estimation provides evidence that the first Arellano–Bond 
Estimator model assumption is satisfied as there is a first-order serial correlation 
of the differenced errors but not a second-order correlation. In the second 
specification test, I examined the validity of my instruments with the Sargan Test 
by using the Stata command ‘estat sargan.’ This test for overidentifying restrictions 
provides evidence that the generated IV are healthy and acceptable instruments. 
Thus, it is legitimate to conclude that Model 5, using the Arellano Bond Estimator, 
allows the identification of true causal effects rather than simple correlations found 
in Model 1 to Model 4.  
The coefficient estimates reported using the Arellano-Bond Estimator are 
shown in Table 4 in Chapter V. 
b. Model 6: Raw Data Analysis Using Arellano-Bond Estimator 
As I did to my Model 2 using the NBR, I conduct a raw data analysis in this 
chapter to find the true causal effects of each single indicator of state condition on 
the number of terrorist attacks. Accordingly, my linear Dynamic Panel Regression 
Model uses each of the 12 cohesion, economic, political, and social indicators 
sequentially. I tested several lag structures to specify a two-step Arellano-Bond 
Estimator with varying numbers of lags to satisfy the requirements of the post-
estimation tests. I include lags of the dependent variable as additional regressors 
and moreover treat the indicator variable to be endogenous to the number of 
terrorist attacks. As in the previous model, I use a robust variance estimator to 
obtain robustness against heteroskedasticity. Appendix C shows the results from 
this raw data analysis. 
c. Model 7.1: Best Fitted Model—Number of Terrorist Attacks and 
State Fragility (Arellano-Bond Estimator) 
A more sophisticated version of Model 5 and Model 6, using several 
indicator variables of the FSI, allows for a more detailed insight as it further 
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disentangles the nexus of fragility and terrorist activities. As I did previously, I use 
a two-step Arellano-Bond Estimator with the robust variance estimator to obtain 
robustness against heteroskedasticity. Model 7.1 includes three lags of the 
dependent variable as additional regressors and furthermore treats all explanatory 
indicator variables as strictly endogenous variables. The diagnostics of the two 
required post-estimations techniques prove Model 7.1 to be valid.  
The coefficient estimates reported in Table 5 of Chapter V show the causal 
impacts of the respective indicators of state fragility on the number of terrorist 
attacks. 
d. Model 7.2: Best Fitted Model—Logged Total Value (in $) and 
State Fragility (Arellano-Bond Estimator) 
Following the recommendation of Young to use a different 
operationalization of terrorism, I utilize the alternative dependent variable 
logtotalvalue, introduced in Chapter III (Young, 2016). In Model 7.2, this variable 
expresses the logarithmic aggregate value of the total damage incurred per 
country and year. It is designed to allow the determination of terrorism not only by 
the number of incidents but also in terms of magnitude.  
Model 7.2 is similar to Model 7.1 and uses a robust two-step Arellano-Bond 
Estimator to obtain robustness against heteroskedasticity. Instead of the 
previously used three lags, it includes one lag of the dependent variable as an 
additional regressor and furthermore treats all explanatory indicator variables as 
strictly endogenous.  
The coefficient estimates reported in Table 6 in Chapter V show the causal 
impacts of the indicators of state fragility on the aggregate value of the total 
damage. 
e. Model 7.3: Best Fitted Model—Total Number of Fatalities and 
State Fragility (Arellano-Bond Estimator)  
In Model 7.3, I treat the aggregate value of total kills and total wounded 
(killnwound) as my dependent variable. Compared to both previously introduced 
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regressands, this dependent variable is a more balanced metric to operationalize 
terrorism. Model 7.3 uses a robust two-step Arellano-Bond Estimator and includes 
three lags of the dependent variable as additional regressors. The explanatory 
indicator variables are treated to be strictly endogenous. My post-estimation 
results prove Model 7.3 to be valid. The coefficient estimates reported in Table 7 
of Chapter V show the causal impacts of indicators of state fragility on the 
aggregate value of total kills and total wounded. 
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V. RESULTS 
A. RESULTS FROM THE NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION MODELS 
This chapter’s purpose is to present and to discuss the results from this 
research’s models introduced previously. First, I present the results from the NBR 
models. In a second step, later in this chapter, I present the outcomes from this 
research’s models using the Arellano-Bond Estimator.  
1. Model 1: Number of Terrorist Attacks and State Fragility 
The results of the estimation from Model 1 are shown in Table 1. All 
coefficient estimates are reported in incident rate ratios. 
Table 1.   Model 1 






total FSI score 0.993*** 
  [0.002] 
Observations 1,871 
Number of countries 173 
N 1871 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Coefficient estimates reported in Incident Rate Ratios (IRR) 
 
The coefficient estimates provide strong and statistically significant 
evidence that demonstrate fragility is associated with the number of terrorist 
incidents. The finding is of little economic significance as the reported coefficient 
estimate for totalFSI is close to 1 and the associated number of terrorist attacks 
decreases by .7% with every one-unit increase of the total FSI score. 
Nevertheless, the latter conclusion is surprising, as it implies that more fragile 
countries, on average, experience fewer terrorist attacks than more stable 
countries, a finding which is contrary to Piazza (2008), who found statistical 
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evidence that "states experiencing intense state failures are statistically more likely 
to be the target of attacks and are more likely to have their nationals commit attacks 
overseas" (p. 481). 
A reason for this rather unexpected result might be attributed to the 
underreporting bias for states known to censor or control media described in 
Chapter III.  
The AIC and BIC for Model 1 are 8,435.97 and 8,447.04, respectively. 
2. Model 2: Raw Data Analysis—Number of Terrorist Attacks and 
State Fragility 
The coefficient estimates of Model 2 shown in Appendix B reveal that eight 
out of the 12 indicator variables have a statistically significant relationship with the 
number of terrorist attacks. These moreover economically significant variables are 
Factionalized Elites ***, Group Grievance***, Economic Inequality***, Human 
Flight and Brain Drain***, State Legitimacy***, Human Rights***, Demographic 
Pressures***, and Refugees and IDPs*.  
The coefficient estimates of each single indicator variable are smaller than 
1; thus, they indicate a negative relationship with the number of terrorist attacks. 
These results are interesting as they back my findings from Model 1 that more 
fragile countries, on average, experience fewer terrorist attacks than more stable 
countries. The variables with the biggest magnitude are Economic Inequality*** 
with on average 16.83% fewer incidents per one-unit increase of the FSI score and 
Human Rights*** with 9.09%, respectively.  
Again, these findings do not match Piazza’s results but support my 
outcomes from Model 1 that fragile states experience less terrorist activities. Yet, 
this does not tell much about these countries’ resilience against terrorism, as it 
might just be that fragile states are simply not a worthwhile target for terrorists. On 
the other hand, this result can be interpreted analogously to Mansfield and 
Snyder’s concept of an inverted U (Mansfield & Snyder, 1995). The authors found 
evidence that the war-proneness of a country depends on the degree of its level 
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of democratization and that strong autocracies tend to have the least risk to be 
involved in a war compared to those states in transition. This argument finds further 
support by Findley and Young who found evidence that regimes in transition are 
more likely to be faced with terrorism (Findley & Young, 2011) and moreover by 
Blomberg et al., who showed that countries at intermediate levels of social diversity 
provide an environment that induces terrorist activities (Blomberg et al., 2011). A 
very similar result was published by Krieger and Meierrieks (2011), who found 
evidence terrorism can emerge as a result of a political transformation process, 
which enhances political vacuums. In this context, it seems reasonable to assume 
that the incidence of terror does not follow a strictly linear pattern, other than that 
found by Piazza (2008).  
Nevertheless, the insights from my raw data analysis should not be 
overrated, as a country’s stability can never be determined by a single indicator 
variable. The complexity of the concept of state fragility clearly demands the 
inclusion of more than just one explanatory variable. 
3. Model 3: Number of Terrorist Attacks and Indicators of State 
Fragility 
The results of my estimation from Model 1 are shown in Table 2. All 









Table 2.   Model 3 





Factionalized Elites 1 
 [0.037] 




Economic Inequality 0.766*** 
 [0.029] 
Human Flight and Brain Drain 1.031 
 [0.031] 
State Legitimacy 0.947 
 [0.041] 
Public Services 1.266*** 
 [0.049] 
Human Rights 0.982 
 [0.037] 
Demographic Pressures 0.881*** 
 [0.037] 
Refugees and IDPs 1.049** 
 [0.024] 
External Intervention 1.023 
  [0.031] 
Observations 1,871 
Number of countries 173 
N 1871 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Coefficient estimates reported in Incident Rate Ratios (IRR) 
 
The statistically significant variables of Model 3 are Economic Inequality, 
Public Services, Demographic Pressures, and Refugees and IDPs, all of which are 
economically significant, too. The coefficient estimates reported in Table 4 indicate 
that a one-unit increase of the index score for Economic Inequality is associated 
with a decrease in the number of terrorist attacks by 23.4%. Furthermore, 
Demographic Pressures is also associated with a negative impact on the number 
of incidents, with an 11.8% decrease of terrorist attacks per one-unit increase of 
the index score.  
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Instead, Public Services and Refugees and IDPs are positively related with 
the number of terrorist attacks. A one-unit increase of the score is associated with 
an increase in the numbers of incidents by 26.6 % or 4.9%, respectively. The AIC 
and BIC for Model 3 are 8328.969 and 8395.38, respectively; thus, this model 
approximates and explains the data better than Model 1 does.  
4. Model 4: Best Fitted Model—Number of Terrorist Attacks and 
Indicators of State Fragility 
In comparison with my other NBR models, Model 4 seems to be fitted best, 
as the post-estimation for AIC and BIC reports the lowest values with 8325.865 
and 8381.207, respectively. The results of my estimation from Model 4 are shown 
in Table 3. Again, all coefficient estimates are reported in incident rate ratios. 
Table 3.   Model 4 





Economic Inequality 0.762*** 
 [0.029] 
Public Services 1.268*** 
 [0.049] 
Demographic Pressures 0.881*** 
 [0.036] 
Refugees and IDPs 1.052** 
 [0.024] 
State Legitimacy 0.939* 
 [0.034] 




Human Flight and Brain Drain 1.036 
 [0.031] 
Factionalized Elites 1.002 
  [0.037] 
Observations 1,871 
Number of countries 173 
N 1871 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Coefficient estimates reported in Incident Rate Ratios (IRR) 
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All the explanatory variables of Model 4 are statistically significant at the 2% 
level or even better, except for the variable State Legitimacy, which is significant 
at the 8.7% level. Moreover, all of my findings are economically significant, too. 
The coefficient estimates of the indicator variables Public Services and Refugees 
and IDPs express a positive relationship with my dependent variable, whereas the 
remaining three explanatory variables are associated with decreasing numbers of 
terrorist attacks.  
My results indicate that a one-unit increase in the score of the indicator 
variable Public Services is associated with a 26.8% increase of incidents. 
Furthermore, they provide evidence that as a country’s refugee situation worsens 
by one unit, it is related to a 5.2% higher number of terrorist incidents.  
In contrast, a worsening uneven economic development (Economic 
Inequality) by one unit is correlated with a 23.8% decrease in incidents. The same 
negative relationship is reported for Demographic Pressures with an associated 
decrease by 11.89% per one-unit increase of the index score and State Legitimacy 
with a 6% decrease, respectively.   
5. Discussion of the Results of the NBR Models 
The coefficient estimates of Model 1 provide highly significant statistical 
evidence that state fragility is associated with the number of terrorist incidents. 
Model 1 offers a strong indication that there is a consistent relationship between 
the number of terrorist attacks and the level of state fragility. However, Model 1 is 
not suitable to derive a conclusion in terms of magnitude as the level of economic 
significance is very close to zero (-0.7%). This very weak economically negative 
association between my variables asks for further investigation to disentangle the 
associated effects of the several indicator variables that are provided by the FSI 
and to identify the at-risk characteristics of a country. Accordingly, I included these 
12 indicator variables in my next model to investigate how they are intertwined with 
each other. In a first step, the results of my raw data analysis (Model 2) consolidate 
the outcomes from Model 1, which indicates a weak negative relationship between 
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X and Y in terms of magnitude. I found that all single indicators variables, 
independently regressed on my dependent variable, are negatively correlated with 
the number of terrorist attacks, regardless of their statistical significance. This is a 
very interesting result, as it would debunk Piazza's finding (2008) that fragile states 
are significantly more susceptible to terrorist attacks.  
The joint estimation of the several indicator variables provided by the FSI 
conducted with Model 3 allows a more detailed analysis of the nexus of terrorism 
and state fragility. This more sophisticated version of Model 1 is designed to take 
advantage of the broad data and furthermore acknowledges and addresses an 
issue of collinearity associated with the indicator variable Security Apparatus. 
Model 3 reveals evidence that some indicator variables are positively associated 
with my dependent variable, thus indicating that a worsening of Public Services 
and a country’s refugee situation are correlated with an increase in terrorist 
attacks.  
It is important to admit that all my NBR models are not designed to find 
causal impacts; thus, they estimate correlations between state fragility and the 
number of terrorist attacks. More importantly, it is necessary to acknowledge this 
methodology does not appropriately account for the role of endogeneity in this 
fragility-terrorism nexus, which stems from a reverse causality bias, as fragility 
might lead terrorism and consequently destabilizes a country.  
To conclude about potential significant causal effects between indicators of 
state fragility and the incidence of terrorism, I have to refer to the results from my 
Models 5 to Model 7.3. 
B. RESULTS FROM THE ARELLANO BOND ESTIMATOR MODELS 
In this section I present and discuss the outcomes of my models using the 
Arellano-Bond Estimator. 
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1. Model 5: Number of Terrorist Attacks and State Fragility 
(Arellano-Bond Estimator) 
The results of my estimation from Model 5 are shown in Table 4. 
Table 4.   Model 5 
Model 5: Number of Terrorist Attacks and State Fragility (Arellano-Bond Estimator) 





total FSI score -6.093 
  [3.771] 
Observations 1,531 
Number of countries 173 
N 1531 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Model 5 provides statistical evidence of borderline significance (p=.106) that 
a higher total FSI score, in other words more fragile countries, on average incur 
fewer terrorist attacks compared to more stable states. This finding is in 
accordance with my results from Model 1, but to a different extent. Yet it contradicts 
Piazza who found that relationship to be positive (Piazza, 2008). Moreover, Model 
5 allows the determination of the instantaneous effect of the total number of 
terrorist attacks in this period on the total number of incidents in future. 
Consequently, the first lag of the dependent variable can explain an increase in 
terrorist attacks in the period thereafter. There is no statistical evidence, however, 
that it will also impact terrorism in the period after next.  
My findings reveal that a terrorist attack in this period entails .79 terrorist 
attacks in the next period. In the course of this, the reverse direction of this lagged 
independent variable’s impact on the number of terrorist attacks relative to the 
effect of the totalFSI variable dilutes the total effect and requires attention with 
respect to the accurate interpretation of this model’s outcomes. This is especially 
true as the magnitude of this reciprocal effect is quite remarkable. Regardless the 
ultimate quantitative extent of this causal relationship, my results provide two 
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important insights. First, fragile countries on average incur fewer terrorist attacks 
than the more stable countries, and second, the anticipated reverse causality bias 
in the fragility-terrorism nexus proves to be a matter of fact at the highest level of 
significance. Consequently, it is legitimate to conclude that terrorism has a self-
sustaining potential in the short term, as terrorist attacks do have an instantaneous 
effect on terrorist activities in the next period.  
The results of the following models allow a more detailed insight into the 
fragility-terrorism relationship and attest to this borderline significant outcome 
being reasonably valid.  
2. Model 6: Raw Data Analysis—Number of Terrorist Attacks and 
State Fragility (Arellano-Bond Estimator) 
The results of my estimation of Model 6 are reported in Appendix C. The 
coefficient estimates reveal that four out of the 12 indicator variables have a 
statistically significant relation with the number of terrorist attacks. These also 
economically significant variables are Group Grievance (p=.049), Economic 
Inequality (p=.097), Human Flight and Brain Drain (p=.049), and External 
Intervention (.042). The indicator variable State Legitimacy is of borderline 
significance at a p-value of .108. Moreover, the first additional regressors of the 
lagged dependent variable prove all to be a statistically highly significant (p=.00) 
cause for the numbers of terrorist attacks in the next period, but not for the period 
thereafter. This relationship is robust as it supports my results from Model 5 as the 
single indicator variable’s coefficient estimates are distributed over a relatively 
small effect-size interval ranging from .7591 to .8065.  
The coefficient estimate of the Factionalized Elites* variable is positive, thus 
indicates that more fragile states are likely to incur more terrorist attacks. 
Conversely, all remaining significant coefficient estimates do have a lessening 
effect on terrorists’ activities. Again, these findings don’t match Piazza’s results but 
support my findings from Model 1 and Model 5 (Piazza, 2008).  
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Beside these statistically significant findings, it is also important to pay 
attention to those indicator variables which are incapable to explain terrorism in 
this raw data analysis, thus, are at best suitable to be included as control variables 
in my next models. The variables Factionalized Elites, Public Services, Human 
Rights, Demographic Pressures, and Refugees and IDPs and Economy to the 
highest extend, are all shown to be statistically insignificant, though again reveal a 
predominantly downward direction. With respect to literature or rather the public 
perception, the association of migration-induced influx of refugees and terrorism is 
extremely controversially discussed (Randahl, 2016; Choi & Salehyan, 2013).  
Allover, these sometimes-contrasting single indicator variable’s impacts on 
my dependent variable make it worthwhile to investigate the causal relationships 
in a more comprehensive model. I will present the findings in the following chapter.  
3. Model 7.1: Best Fitted Model—Number of Terrorist Attacks and 
State Fragility (Arellano-Bond Estimator) 
Model 7.1 is a comprehensive model designed to discern a causal 
relationship in the terrorism-fragility nexus and to address the issue of endogeneity 












Table 5.   Model 7.1 















Factionalized Elites 106.499* 
 [59.046] 
Economic Inequality 64.295* 
 [34.034] 
Human Flight and Brain Drain -95.443* 
 [49.102] 
Public Services -16.997 
 [35.699] 
External Intervention -97.694* 
 [50.851] 
State Legitimacy 11.641 
  [28.883] 
Observations 1,185 
Number of countries 173 
N 1185 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Once endogeneity is properly accounted for by means of my IV approach, 
a worsening of some of a country’s stability factors can solidly predict an increase 
in terrorist attacks. Consequently, the identified and statistically significant 
positively related root causes for terrorism are Factionalized Elites (p=.071) and 
Economic Inequality (p= .059). 
This finding of inequality causing terrorism is consistent with the theory of 
relative deprivation, which contends that frustration over the distribution of 
resources will increase the potential for conflicts and collective violence (Gurr, 
1970). Relatively low opportunity costs for violence and an inciting frustration can 
be an explanation for this relation. Krieger et al. have argued that “terrorist 
organizations should find it easier (less costly) to recruit frustrated followers or to 
receive funding from supporters when economic deprivation prevails” (Krieger et 
al., 2011, p. 6). They add that “the lack of non-violent economic activities may also 
fill the ranks of terrorist organizations by lowering the opportunity costs of violence” 
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(Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011, p. 6). In a different paper Krieger and Meierrieks found 
robust causal evidence that “higher levels of income inequality result in more 
terrorist activity” by using an IV approach (Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011, p. 1). 
With respect to Factionalized Elites, which was insignificant in the previous 
model, the level of fragmentation of ruling elites along racial, religious, or ethnic 
lines determines the number of terrorist attacks. In this model, the indicator 
variable Factionalized Elites becomes an important determinant of terrorism and 
my findings are further backed by the literature (Kis-Katos et al., 2012; Schulz, 
2015). The coefficient estimate of this explanatory variable is the most significant 
of all my estimates, both in statistical and economic terms and shows that the more 
divided a national leadership is, the more often a country suffers from terrorism. In 
detail, a one-unit increase of the index score causes 104 additional terrorist attacks 
on average, holding all other variables constant. Apparently, a fractious political 
class is highly susceptible to terrorist attacks as it is less able to overcome the 
discords of a society with the ruling elites. An explanation for this causal 
relationship can be the absence of a legitimate and broadly accepted government 
that fails to represent the entire citizenry. Political structures that are not rooted in 
the majority of the society, thus lacking legitimacy and furthermore effective 
governance, seem to induce terrorist attacks. In this context, though, it is 
presumably inefficient governance rather than the lack of legitimacy that is the 
main reason, as the control variable State Legitimacy remains highly insignificant 
(p=.69) in Model 7.1. This violence inducing mechanism can be explained with the 
coercion theory, which assumes that “it is not voluntary cooperation or general 
consensus but enforced constraint that make social organizations cohere. In 
institutional terms, this means that in every social organization some positions are 
entrusted with a right to exercise control over other positions in order to ensure 
effective coercion; it means, in other words, that there is a differential distribution 
of power and authority…. This differential distribution of authority invariably 
becomes the determining factor of systematic social conflicts of a type that is 
germane to class conflicts in the traditional sense of the term” (Dahrendorf, 1959, 
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p. 165). Consequently, a lack of coercive power ultimately leads to a higher level 
of violence or in this specific context, analogously to an increase of terrorist 
attacks. 
As already found in the previous model, Model 7.1 proves that the total 
number of terrorist attacks in this period has implications for the total number of 
incidents in future, as the first lag of the dependent variable can significantly 
explain an increase in terrorist attacks in the period thereafter. Again, I find that the 
effect is only of relatively short duration. There is no statistical evidence that the 
total number of terrorist attacks in period one (t) will also impact terrorism in the 
period after next or in the period thereafter (t+2 and t+3). My findings reveal that a 
terrorist attack in this period entails .68 terrorist attacks in the next period. Thus, it 
validates my conclusion that terrorism follows a self-sustaining pattern. This causal 
relationship can be explained by the public attention paid to terrorist attacks. The 
deterring and overwhelming effect of terrorism encourages both the rational 
strategists administering their own agenda of terror and their imitators to carry out 
further attacks. Whereas the strategists are driven by the efforts of their recently 
conducted terrorist operations, their imitators get inspired by either the method of 
attack or the media feedback in the public perception (Lawson & Stedmon, 2015). 
Either way, this relationship describes an unsustainable trend with a declining 
leverage, which can be explained by the mechanism of the Recency Effect. 
Despite this insignificance in the long term, this discernment of a causal affiliation 
epitomizes one of the most important findings of my thesis. It proves that terror is 
endogenous to the used indicator variables of state fragility and moreover 
describes an endemic phenomenon expressing a partially self-sustaining pattern. 
Furthermore, Model 7.1 also postulates coefficient estimates of indicators 
of fragility that have a decreasing impact on the numbers of terrorist attacks. 
Contrary to the positive relationship described before, my results show that a more 
unfavorable, thus higher score of Human Flight and Brain Drain (p=.052) and 
External Interventions (p=.055) reduce the total number of terrorist attacks. The 
Human Flight and Brain Drain variable measures the loss of intellectuals, 
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professionals, and political dissidents and accounts for voluntary emigration. A 
higher index score indicates that the brain drain of a country became chronic and 
sustained, which results in a significant decline of the professional and middle 
class of the country (Fund for Peace, 2014). This finding aligns with my results 
from the Economic Inequality variable that relates inequality such as a higher 
relative deprivation to an increase in terrorist attacks. An increase in the emigration 
of intellectuals reduces the magnitude of inequality and accordingly decreases the 
total number of terrorist attacks. It seems that both variables Economic Inequality 
and Human Flight and Brain Drain have adverse impacts on the dependent 
variable of my model. This might be an indicator for collinearity; though, given the 
data, it is impossible to determine the degree. 
My coefficient estimates for the indicator variable External Interventions 
reveal another negative relationship between the explanatory variables of my 
model and my dependent variable. This indictor measures the extent of the full 
spectrum of means of external interventions (Fund for Peace, 2014). Relatively 
moderate types of intervention, indicated by lower scores, are economic 
interventions by external actors, including NGOs, development projects, and 
foreign aid. More powerful means of external interventions are military 
engagements such as covert or overt interventions, externally supported militia, 
and in its strongest form, peacekeeping missions. Given this design of the External 
Interventions variable, this indicator allows us to derive some interesting 
conclusions. It seems that weaker instruments of external power projection at least 
do not have a lessening effect or maybe even have an unfavorable effect on the 
number of terrorist attacks. This can be for several reasons. First of all, economic 
interventions as part of a foreign aid program are not specifically designed to 
counter terrorism but to improve a country’s economy and consequently its 
humanitarian situation in the long term. The purpose of economic aid and 
associated cash flows is to ensure the subsistence level for the people, to provide 
minimal standards, and moreover to foster prosperity. Thus, if at all, this quality of 
external intervention does have an implicit intent to counter terroristic behavior. A 
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second reason for this unfavorable relationship between the External Interventions 
variable and terrorism can be the inefficient allocation and use of external aids. 
Roodman (2007) shows that “much aid is poorly used —or, like venture capital, is 
good bets gone bad” (p. 18). Also, Mascarenhas and Sandler (2014) hypothesize 
that “foreign aid inflows may elevate terrorists’ resources (p. 337), thereby 
increasing terror,” and find that lagged remittances in fact have a positive impact 
on terrorism (Mascarenhas & Sandler, 2014). This obvious allocation problem 
might have further implications for the factionalization of a country and could 
eventually lead to a higher magnitude of perceived inequality. Both results arising 
from this distribution problem are actually increasing the number of terrorist 
attacks.  
In contrast to these moderate instruments’ increasing impact on the number 
of terrorist attacks, the more powerful means of external interventions do at least 
have a containing effect on terrorist activities. According to my findings, the 
projection of military force entails fewer terrorist attacks and consequently appears 
to be an appropriate tool to mitigate, but not eradicate, terrorism as the confidence 
interval of this variable, ranging from -197.36 to 1.97, remains predominantly 
negative. Thus, my results prove that these interventions of highest intensity are 
not suitable to straightforwardly serve a sound and sustainable counterterrorism 
strategy. Notwithstanding, indirectly they do, as these means also affect the 
numbers of terrorist attacks in the next period.  
I conclude that regardless the scale of a military intervention, the presence 
of foreign military forces obviously affects terrorist behavior.  
To prevent an unfavorable effect from collinearity between the Factionalized 
Elites and Group Grievance variables, I omitted the latter variable in this model. It 
is important to admit that a certain amount of collinearity remains between my 
different indicator variables. For this reason, the coefficient estimates always have 
to be interpreted in conjunction with the results from my raw data analysis in Model 
6.  
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With respect to my previous recognition of irrelevant indicator variables, 
which are unsuitable to explain terrorism in a raw data analysis, I purposefully did 
not control for the Economy and Refugees and IDPs variables in my final Model 
7.1, as the model does not improve from it. However, if I included them, they 
remained highly insignificant, which again supports my conclusion from Model 6 
that economy and the influx of refugees have no causal implications for the number 
of terrorist attacks. Instead, their high level of insignificance indirectly refutes Choi 
and Salehyan, who claimed that a rising number of refugees leads to more terrorist 
activities (Choi & Salehyan, 2013). My finding holds in the short term; however, 
over time and subject to a society’s capacity to assimilate and integrate refugees, 
this increasing influx might eventually lead to a higher extent of factionalization, 
which was shown to induce terrorist attacks.  
In a guest lecture at the Heinrich Heine University of Dusseldorf, former 
Federal President of Germany Joachim Gauck, took a general position with regard 
to the long-term consequences of migration for a host country and its society. He 
elaborated that “a nation-state should not be overstrained. Anyone who imagines, 
as an imaginary representative of a world citizenship, taking away all borders of 
the nation-state, not only overburdens the material, territorial and social capacities 
of every state, but also the psychological capacities of its citizens. Even 
cosmopolitan people reach their limits when developments of a cultural nature are 
too fast and too extensive” (Tychis Einblick. Das liberal-konservative 
Meinungsmagazin [Tychi's insight. The liberal-conservative opinion magazine], 
2018).2 This statement reflects exactly the results of my analysis and puts 
emphasis on the role of social capacities to integrate refugees. 
4. Model 7.2: Best Fitted Model—Logged Total Monetary 
Value and State Fragility (Arellano-Bond Estimator)
The results from my estimation of Model 7.2 are presented in Table 6. 
2 This speech was held in the German language. For the purpose of better understanding 
and moreover of putting emphasis on the message, I translated it into English language.  
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Table 6.    Model 7.2  








Factionalized Elites -0.457 
 [0.378] 
Economic Inequality -0.862** 
 [0.344] 
Human Flight and Brain Drain 0.269 
 [0.504] 
Public Services 0.667 
 [0.676] 
External Intervention -0.237 
 [0.383] 
State Legitimacy 0.206 
  [0.684] 
Observations 390 
Number of countries 72 
N 390 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In my Model 7.2, two coefficient estimates, Economic Inequality (p=.012) 
and the first lag of the dependent variable (p=.003), prove to be statistically 
significant. Contrary to my previous results, I find that economic inequality is 
negatively related to the value of total damage. This contradictory finding should 
not be overstated, as Young finds that the coefficient estimates of explanatory 
variables might significantly vary across different operationalizations of terrorism 
(Young, 2016). 
The lag of the dependent variable remains positive and proves the self-
sustaining potential of terrorism once again, however, to a smaller extent. A further 
reason for the divergent outcomes of this model might be the fact that I did not 
discount my aggregate value of total damage to the NPV. Consequently, the 
direction and the magnitude of my coefficient estimates might be misleading.  
Overall, I conclude that this model, using a different operationalization of 
terrorism, is less able to explain the relationship between indicators of state fragility 
and terrorism. Nevertheless, Model 7.2 is partially suitable to discern causality and 
to serve as a robustness check for my claim that economic inequality is a cause of 
terrorism and furthermore terrorism entails terrorism in the next period. 
 54 
5. Model 7.3: Best Fitted Model—Total Number of Fatalities and 
State Fragility (Arellano-Bond Estimator) 
The results from my estimation of Model 7.3 are presented in Table 7.  
Table 7.   Model 7.3 








  [0.075] 
Factionalized Elites 459.582* 
 [242.662] 
L1.Factionalized Elites -193.587 
 [246.377] 
Economic Inequality -553.289 
 [379.744] 
L1.Economic Inequality 673.691 
 [441.434] 
Human Flight and Brain Drain -216.207 
 [247.261] 
L1.Human Flight and Brain Drain -35.39 
 [136.091] 
Public Services 404.373 
 [523.349] 
L1.Public Services -451.103 
 [578.315] 
External Intervention -454.489 
 [402.523] 
L1.External Intervention 240.357 
 [364.922] 
State Legitimacy 85.206 
 [211.512] 
L1.State Legitimacy -240.232 
  [184.300] 
Observations 1,185 
Number of countries 173 
N 1185 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In Model 7.3, I find the variable Factionalized Elites to be significant (p=.058) 
and positively related to my measure of terrorism. Again, the first lag of my 
dependent variable proves to be a good predictor of terrorism in the next period. 
Interestingly, in this model, also the second lag of my dependent variable is 
significant, but this time expressing a downward direction, reducing the total 
reciprocal effect by approximately 40% to a value of .615. This confirms my 
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previous findings of the self-sustaining potential of terrorism: however, these 
effects over the course of time appear to be more persistent. Though there is no 
significant sustainable trend observable, as the third lag of the dependent variable 
is highly insignificant. An explanation for this significance above the threshold of 
one period might be attributed to the design of my operationalization of terrorism, 
which counts fatalities. In this context, it appears possible that the sheer body 
counts do have a bigger leverage with respect to the self-sustaining potential of 
terrorism.  
Consequently, I regard my Model 7.3 to be a partial validation of my Model 
7.1, which expresses the robustness of my results.  
C. COMPARING THE RESULTS FROM THE DIFFERENT MODELS 
In this third and last step of my methodology, I compare the findings from 
my different models to draw some conclusions about the applicability and the 
robustness of my results. The models developed in this thesis have different 
purposes. Model 1 uses the NBR as the industry standard in the research field of 
finding determinants of terror and aims to reproduce Piazza’s approach to 
investigate the fragility-terrorism nexus while taking advantage of the larger 
amount of data available today (Piazza, 2008). This model and its advancements 
are not designed to explicitly find causation. Their purpose is to consider whether 
the security concerns associated with fragile states (POTUS, 2017) are observable 
and verifiable in the data and therefore justify a further and more detailed 
investigation. The downside of this approach is that the NBR model does not 
account for the reverse causality bias stated before and therefore requires a 
thoughtful interpretation especially when it comes to communicating 
recommendations for policy makers.  
Moreover, I introduced Model 5, a model designed to investigate a causal 
relationship between my indicator variables and the number of terrorist attacks and 
which furthermore explicitly addresses the problems arising from the endogeneity 
problem. However, this happens at the expense of a smaller statistical power, as 
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Model 5 uses parts of the data to create practicable and valid instruments from 
past levels to determine causality. Nevertheless, in comparison, this Model 5 and 
its advancements have a greater explanatory power and are more suitable to 
derive recommendations for counterterrorism strategies.  
If, by comparison, all or at least some coefficient estimates of my different 
models are statistically significant and furthermore lead in the same direction, my 
Arellano-Bond Estimator Model allows one to conclude that the NBR is robust 
enough to withstand endogeneity and therefore provides valid and useful 
coefficient estimates. Consequently, the reverse causality bias in the fragility-
terrorism nexus would become more or less negligible. As a result, after this 
validation, the more simplistic NBR model gets a higher connotation with respect 
to its usefulness and applicability, and furthermore takes advantage of coming 
along with higher statistical power.  
In fact, the comparison of the coefficient estimates of numerous variations 
of Model 2 and Model 5 reveals that there was never conformity in terms of 
significance and direction of a variable’s coefficient estimate at the same time. 
Oftentimes, my results from the NBR Model and my Arellano-Bond Estimator 
approach are even highly contradictive, which leads me to the conclusion that the 
count regression model is inappropriate to capture the effects of indicators of state 
fragility on the number of terrorist attacks sufficiently.  
Additionally, the fact that a terrorist attack in period 1 entails between .68 
up to .81 terrorist attacks in the next period illustrates the leverage of the 
endogeneity issue in the fragility-terrorism nexus. Hence, the problems arising 
from this reverse causality bias are simply too substantial to use the NBR as an 
appropriate model to derive strategies for policy makers. Accordingly, all findings 
of determinants of terror using this methodology have a limited information value 
and should be handled with caution. As this statistical model fails to capture the 
effect of terror being endogenous to terrorism, the results are biased and can be 
dilutive and sometimes even misleading. Using the example of my coefficient 
estimates for the indicator variable Refugees and IDPs in my Model 4, this 
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association implies that on average 5.2% more terrorist attacks occur with a one-
unit increase of the index score, which would have serious implications for the 
European countries experiencing the migrant crisis that begun in 2015. However, 
the inclusion of the Refugees and IDPs variable in an Arellano-Bond Estimator 
approach proves to be highly insignificant and therefore leads to the conclusion 
that an influx of refugees does not lead to more terrorism. A second example 
relates to the estimates of my Factionalized Elites, Human Flight and Brain Drain, 
and External Intervention variables, which are highly insignificant in the NBR model 
but are found to have a significant causal implication for terrorism in Model 7.1. In 
contrast to this limited meaningfulness of the correlations from my Models 1 
through 3, the Arellano-Bond Estimator approach is methodologically sound and 
suitable to draw conclusions about the causal relationship between some 
indicators of state fragility and the number of terrorist attacks, or rather, the scale 
of terror.  
  
 58 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 59 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
With my first three models, I adopted Piazza’s approach to investigate the 
relationship between state fragility and terrorism. For this analysis, I used the NBR, 
which is known to be the “standard model in the empirical analysis of terrorism” 
(Kis-Katos et al., 2012, p. 13). Knowing that this model is not suitable to treat my 
dependent variable to be endogenous to the number of terrorist attacks, I found a 
significant but economically weak negative relationship between state fragility and 
the incidence of terror. A raw data analysis in Model 2 validates this finding, which 
is contrary to Piazza (2008), who found evidence that “states experiencing intense 
state failures are statistically more likely to be the target of attacks and are more 
likely to have their nationals commit attacks overseas” (p. 481). 
Nevertheless, in Model 4, I identified the two indicator variables Public 
Services and Refugees and IDPs to be positively associated with the number of 
terrorist attacks. I showed that despite the NBR’s status as the ‘industry standard,’ 
it is an inappropriate model to derive causal implications from the relationship 
between my indicator variables and the number of terrorist attacks, because of the 
associated reverse causality bias.   
In contrast, the Dynamic Panel Regression approach using the Arellano-
Bond Estimator is methodologically sound and suitable to draw conclusions about 
the causal relationship between some indicators of state fragility and the number 
of terrorist attacks, or rather, the scale of terror.  
Model 7.1 provides good arguments to develop recommendations for 
policies and programs as it identifies four indicators of state fragility that are 
causally related with the number of terrorist attacks. Moreover, my Model 7.2 and 
Model 7.3 partially validate the previous findings by using a different dependent 
variable to measure terrorism, thus making my findings more robust. 
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The significant causal effects of indicators of state fragility on terrorism show 
that inequality is an important root cause for terrorist attacks. The intensity of 
relative deprivation, economic inequality, and frustration over the unequal 
distribution of resources have inflammatory effects, which eventually lead to a 
higher incidence of terrorist activity; a finding that confirms the theory of relative 
deprivation introduced by Gurr (Gurr, 1970). Based on this result, it is reasonable 
to conclude that an increase of group-based inequality, whether perceived or an 
objective fact, drives a wedge between a society’s groupings and has a catalytic 
effect on the progress of factionalization. An effective measure to prevent terrorism 
should therefore address this causal relationship and aim to reduce economic 
inequality along group lines. In this context, the economic principle of opportunity 
cost becomes a helpful instrument, as it allows policy makers to determine the 
despair of disadvantaged minorities and moreover helps to monitor and predict 
their violent potential. 
A second root cause for the greater incidence of terrorist attacks is the rise 
of factionalized elites in a society. This indicator variable proves to be a good 
predictor for terrorism as I found a strong and significant underlying relationship 
between this explanatory variable and the number of terrorist attacks. 
Consequently, terror is an outcome of an endemic problem, which is inherent to a 
society and increases with the level of factionalization along ethnic and religious 
lines, and thereby proves the mechanism of revolutionary change introduced by 
Johnson (Johnson, 1982). Moreover, inequalities in access to political power can 
further accelerate this dynamic.  
A strategy to mitigate these adverse dynamics is to intervene with the 
different factions in order to reestablish and moreover to maintain a state of relative 
equilibrium. However, subject to a society’s cultural values, the instruments used 
in this process might vary as they are not universally applicable. Societies are not 
homogenous, which is why policies always have to be tailored to the mission; 
however, the span of available political instruments remains the same. Appropriate 
means to address the problems arising from factionalized elites include attaining 
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political reconciliation, inducing a burgeoning middle class to fill the gaps, 
controlling the concentration of wealth, and supervising the control of resources. 
Also creating a national identity can be a successful strategy to propitiate rival 
groupings. 
Another implication drawn from my results relates to the average mix of 
instruments for external interventions portrayed by the FSI with food aid, 
development assistance, military exercise, military intervention, sanctions, and 
investment climate. This mix of instruments is not set up efficiently to prevent or 
counter terrorist attacks. As a matter of fact, my findings provide proof that a ‘better’ 
external intervention indicator, synonymous with a smaller index score, is actually 
increasing terrorist activities. My results show that the projection of military force 
entails fewer terrorist attacks and consequently appears to be an appropriate tool 
to mitigate, but not eradicate, terrorism as the confidence interval of this variable, 
ranging from 197.36 to 1.971088, remains predominantly negative. Accordingly, 
my results prove that these interventions of highest intensity are not suitable to 
straightforwardly serve a sound and sustainable counterterrorism strategy as they 
do not have an instantaneous lessening effect on the number of terrorist attacks. 
Notwithstanding, indirectly they do have an effect, as these means also affect the 
numbers of terrorist attacks in the next period, thus addressing terrorism’s self-
sustaining mechanism. 
Additionally, an indirect but valuable outcome derived from my Arellano-
Bond Estimator Models relates to the role of refugees. There is absolutely no 
evidence of a significant relationship between my Refugees and IDPs variable and 
terrorism, neither in my raw data analysis of Model 6 nor in any of my more 
advanced models. However, there might be implications in the long term, as a 
worsening of a country’s refugee situation may converge with the problem of 
factionalization and inequality, which remains subject to a society’s capacity to 
assimilate and integrate groups. This has implications for policy insofar as the 
underlying mechanism reveals a strict time-dependency, which might become 
troublesome only over time. Consequently, and seen from the strategic 
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perspective, an open border policy to give shelter to refugees cannot solely be 
justified by altruistic arguments. Despite the moral obligation to help refugees in 
need, such a policy must be accompanied by a set of instruments that 
contemporaneously increase a society’s resilience and capacity to assimilate and 
integrate refugees with a different cultural background. The solution to the problem 
lies in a sustainable and future-oriented handling of migration movements, and the 
strategic toolset should include the consideration of and the potential to implement 
a closed-border-policy to strengthen the resilience of the state and reduce its 
susceptibility for violent outbreaks.  
At the end, my proof that terror is certainly endogenous shows that terrorism 
creates a momentum, which has an instantaneous effect on the prospective 
dynamics of terrorism. The fact that a terrorist attack in period one entails between 
.68 up to .81 terrorist attacks in the next period illustrates the enormous leverage 
of this momentum. The relatively small range of all significant values for the 
coefficient estimates of my lagged dependent variable, subject to the different 
models, demonstrates the robustness of my outcomes. Compared to my other 
identified root causes for terrorism, this predictor has by far the biggest impact on 
terrorism as it follows a morbid self-sustaining pattern.  
Consequently, I like to emphasize the importance to counter terrorist 
activities immediately and rigorously. An early intervention with effective effort, 
therefore, has the potential to significantly decrease the number of future terrorist 
attacks. Furthermore, my findings reinforce the argument that a comprehensive 
and holistic national security strategy to reduce terrorist activities should address 
the problems arising from state fragility, however not per se, but with respect to 
relative deprivation and factionalization along ethnic and religious lines. Knowing 
about these root causes helps decision makers to spend the generally limited 
resources in the fight against terrorism more efficiently.  
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
For future research, I recommend the replication of my results and a more 
detailed analysis with respect to the causal impacts of external interventions on 
state fragility. In view of the aforementioned, it will be relevant to investigate the 
respective causal effects of the sub-indicators, which are jointly evaluated in my 
External Intervention indicator variable. With the data provided by the FSI, it is 
impossible to determine the degree of collinearity between the External 
Intervention variable and inequalities arising from an inefficient use of foreign aid 
over time.  
The same logic applies to the effects of the influx of refugees, subject to the 
society’s capacity to assimilate groups in the long term. Further research is needed 
to investigate the time dependencies between terrorism and migration movements.  
Furthermore, terrorism is not a homogeneous phenomenon although it is 
predominantly treated that way in this thesis. Consequently, for future research I 
recommend an analysis with the focus on the difference between domestic and 
transnational terrorism. Moreover, my presumption that the incidence of terrorism 
does not follow a strictly linear pattern should be subject to further investigations.  
Finally, it is also important to pick up on Young’s recommendation to 
operationalize terrorism differently (Young, 2016). With respect to my totalvalue 
variable, it would be interesting to compare results, once this variable is further 
refined and discounted for the NPV.  
 64 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 65 















Refugees (Country of Asylum/Absorption) 
Refugees (Country of Origin) 
IDPs (Country of Residence) 









































Internet and Communications 
Water and Sanitation 
Electricity and Power 
Indicator: Human 
Rights 













Rebels and Militants 
























APPENDIX B. MODEL 2: RAW DATA ANALYSIS—NUMBER OF 
TERRORIST ATTACKS AND STATE FRAGILITY 
Model 2: Raw Data Analysis - Number of Terrorist Attacks and State Fragility (FE NBR) 
incperyear . . . . . . . . . . . . 





           
 [0.0
15] 
           
Factionalized 
Elites 
 0.938***           
  [0.015]           
Group 
Grievance 
  0.927***          
   [0.018]          
Economy    0.994         
    [0.018]         
Economic 
Inequality 
    0.832***        




     0.953***       
      [0.018]       
State 
Legitimacy 
      0.914***      
       [0.016]      
Public 
Services 
       0.991     
        [0.016]     
Human Rights         0.909***    
         [0.016]    
Demographic 
Pressures 
         0.919***   
          [0.017]   
Refugees and 
IDPs 
          0.971*  
           [0.015]  
External 
Intervention 
           0.978 
                        [0.017] 
Observations 1,8
71 
1,871 1,871 1,871 1,871 1,871 1,871 1,871 1,871 1,871 1,871 1,871 
Number of 
countries 
173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 
N 187
1 
1871 1871 1871 1871 1871 1871 1871 1871 1871 1871 1871 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





















APPENDIX C. MODEL 6: RAW DATA ANALYSIS—NUMBER OF 
TERRORIST ATTACKS AND STATE FRAGILITY (ARELLANO-
BOND ESTIMATOR) 
Model 6: Raw Data Analysis - Number of Terrorist Attacks and State Fragility (Arellano-Bond Estimator) 
incperyear            
L1. 0.781*** 0.759*** 0.831*** 0.799*** 0.807*** 0.770*** 0.791*** 0.863*** 0.786*** 0.794*** 0.788*** 
 [0.129] [0.136] [0.150] [0.164] [0.182] [0.137] [0.103] [0.162] [0.118] [0.117] [0.090] 
L2.  - - - - - - - - - - -0.009 
  - - - - - - - - - - [0.143] 
Factional-
ized Elites 34.086           
 [25.766]           
Group 
Grievance  55.056**          
  [27.998]          
Economy   -2.747         
   [6.360]         
Economic 
Inequality    -6.369*        
    [3.836]        
Human 
Flight and 
Brain Drain     -52.916**       
     [26.870]       
State 
Legitimacy      -102.25      
      [63.602]      
Public 
Services       -52.477     
       [42.131]     
Human 
Rights        -77.19    
        [54.229]    
Demograp
hic 
Pressures         -14.715   
         [12.211]   
Refugees 
and IDPs          -4.005  
          [19.608]  
External 
Intervention           -153.452** 
                      [75.486] 
Observa-
tions 1,531 1,531 1,531 1,531 1,531 1,531 1,531 1,531 1,531 1,531 1,358 
Number of 
countries 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 173 
N 1531 1531 1531 1531 1531 1531 1531 1531 1531 1531 1358 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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